



Breaking Through the Challenges of Taiwan's International Engagement

By Yu-Jie Chen

The enduring exclusion of Taiwan, or Republic of China, from the United Nations and a multitude of international organizations is not a recent development. For decades, the People's Republic of China has been able to establish itself as the gatekeeper for Taiwan's international engagement and has repeatedly succeeded in marginalizing Taiwan from the international stage.¹

What is troubling, though, is that in recent years, China has stepped up the use of legal narratives in the international context regarding Taiwan. This includes conflating Beijing's sovereign claim over Taiwan with international norms. Through this narrative, the PRC asserts that its sovereignty over Taiwan is a universally accepted fact, despite a significant number of countries continuing to contest Beijing's assertion.

China's Legal Narratives to Internationalize Its "One China Principle"

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) intensification of legal narratives became particularly salient following the ascension of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to power in Taiwan in 2016. Since then, the CCP has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance, employing a range of coercive measures—including military, economic and diplomatic tactics—to compel the DPP government to accept Beijing's "one China principle," which asserts that there is only China, that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Concurrently, Beijing has actively pursued an *international* agenda aimed

at globalizing its one China principle, asserting that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. This heightened push to isolate Taiwan within the international community, coupled with China's growing antagonism towards Taiwan in recent years, are detrimental to ensuring Taiwan's security.

The ambiguity of Taiwan's legal status—a contentious issue of whether Taiwan should be considered as part of China, an independent state, or a *sui generis* political entity—has provoked a spectrum of interpretations among scholars.² The question remains far from settled within the context of international law. In the realm of international politics, this issue is further complicated. While some align with the one China principle, many states and international organizations have their own “one China policy”—recognizing the PRC as China's sole legal representative—while not accepting China's assertion over Taiwan.³

Nevertheless, Beijing seems intent on erasing these divergent perspectives. The effort to promote the one China principle on an international scale is not new for Beijing. As early as 1993, for example, it referred to the one China principle as “a universally recognized fact.”⁴ However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable escalation in Beijing's rhetoric, both in framing and frequency. The one China principle is now often equated with what is portrayed as “a general consensus of the international community” or “a basic norm governing international relations” (refer to Appendix B for related statements), and this idea has been propagated on various international occasions. Beijing's intensified discourse appears to be aimed at lending legitimacy to its assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan through misrepresentation.

Such discourse, along with Taiwan's continued exclusion from the international regime, has significant implications not only for Taiwan's representation in international organizations but also for the integrity of global governance. An inclusive and principled approach to international governance would be better served by including Taiwan as a valuable partner. This inclusion would align more closely with the stated missions of international organizations, enabling them to benefit from Taiwan's contributions.

Less apparent but equally significant are the potential *legal* implications for Taiwan's status. Article 38 of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies “general principles of law” as one of the sources of international law, which can be evidenced by the endorsement of a majority of nations. Beijing appears to aspire to align the one China principle with such “general principles of law.” The combination of this narrative with Taiwan's limited access to key international institutions for conflict resolution can contribute to Beijing's portrayal of any potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait as a “civil war/internal war” (*neizhang*), rather than an invasion to annex Taiwan.

Disentangling China's Representation from Taiwan's Representation and Sovereignty

China has repeatedly sought to conflate its one China principle with universally accepted norms. Beyond asserting that its one China principle represents an international consensus, Beijing has focused its campaign on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2758, misrepresenting it as synonymous with the PRC's claim of owning Taiwan. For instance, after Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August



2022, China issued a white paper on “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” asserting that “Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one China Principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide.”

Invoking UNGA resolution 2758 (see Appendix A) to preclude discussions concerning Taiwan’s status and obstruct Taiwan’s international participation is misleading.⁵ In 1971, when UN member states adopted the resolution, they voted solely on which government should represent China in the United Nations—the ROC government in Taiwan or the mainland PRC government. The resolution that ultimately passed “recognize[d] that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” Essentially, UNGA resolution 2758 and similar resolutions in UN specialized agencies addressed only the question of *China’s representation*.

Taiwan’s sovereignty remains a contested and unresolved issue under international law. It is indefensible to argue that a resolution solely on China’s representation definitively settles issues related to Taiwan’s status and its representation. While the General Assembly has the authority to decide, in accordance with UN rules, which government should represent China, it does not possess the legal authority to serve as the ultimate arbiter of Taiwan’s statehood under international law.

In reality, Taiwan is beyond China’s jurisdiction, and the interests of its 23 million people have never been represented by the PRC in any international organization. This situation mirrors the fact that from 1949, the PRC’s establishment, to 1971, the ROC government did not represent the population of mainland China within the United Nations.

The issues of both *Taiwan’s representation* and *its sovereignty* exceed the purview of UNGA resolution 2758 and similar resolutions within UN specialized agencies.

Misleading Practices by International Organizations

China’s consistent efforts to misconstrue international resolutions can mislead IOs, notably the United Nations and its specialized agencies, potentially influencing their leadership and legal viewpoints. In 2007, for instance, when Taiwan’s diplomatic ally tried to deposit with the UN Secretary-General Taiwan’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the then United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon responded that “In accordance with [UNGA resolution 2758], the United Nations considers Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.” Yet, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as the chief administrative officer of the organization, does not have independent decision-making power concerning substantive matters such as recognizing states or deciding territorial claims. Ban’s statement went beyond his power and that of the General Assembly and was subsequently refuted by the United States and other democracies, leading Ban to row back on his comments and “confirmed that the UN would no longer use the phrase ‘Taiwan is a part of China.’”⁶

During Ban Ki-moon’s tenure, however, misleading assertions within the United Nations continued to emerge. In 2010, the UN Juridical Yearbook, produced by the Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, contained two interoffice memorandums. The first memorandum, regarding the reference of Taiwan, stated that “the question



of 'Taiwan' in the United Nations is regulated by General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971," adding that "[s]ince the adoption of that resolution the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status." Consequently, the Secretariat directed the use of the term "Taiwan, Province of China" in all UN Secretariat documents that necessitate a reference to Taiwan. The second memorandum, concerning the registration of Taiwanese representatives of non-governmental organizations, expressed the same view. Based on UNGA resolution 2758, it concluded that "the 'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not considered to be a government, enjoy any form of governmental status or to exercise any governmental powers."⁷

These opinions, however, constituted an overreaching interpretation of the 1971 resolution on China's representation and were inconsistent with the intentions of the member states that voted for the resolution. Nevertheless, China has cited them as though they were authoritative decisions. In the 2022 white paper on Taiwan, for instance, Beijing, referencing the 2010 UN Juridical Yearbook, claimed that, according to the official legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat, "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status."⁸

The disputing of legal views expressed by the UN Secretariat is not a new occurrence. As early as 1947, when challenged, the Assistant Secretary-General clarified that a legal opinion expressed by the Secretariat "could not, and was not intended to affect in any way the action of the other organs of the United Nations," emphasizing the restricted influence of the Secretariat's legal perspectives.⁹ Nevertheless, misleading legal opinions can have tangible effects, such as normalizing the reference

to Taiwan as a province of China. They must be challenged, both through private channels and public means, to alert UN member states and leadership to these inaccuracies.

The relationship between the World Health Organization (WHO) and Taiwan has also been controversial. In 2005, the WHO Secretariat concluded an undisclosed memorandum of understanding with China, a document that identified Taiwan as part of China. It further mandated that Beijing's consent would be necessary for the participation of any Taiwanese medical expert in WHO-related events.¹⁰ According to Chinese diplomats, the MOU serves as a "special arrangement" to handle matters related to Taiwan.¹¹ The undisclosed nature of this document raises concerns regarding the scope of the Secretariat's authority, especially when exercised without the express knowledge or consent of the member states. Following this, in 2010, senior WHO officials circulated an internal confidential memo, directing WHO agencies to refer to Taiwan as a "Province of China," seemingly in accordance with the 2005 arrangement made with Beijing.¹²

This pattern of misrepresentation is not exclusive to the UN system. In 2022, for example, the Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), Jurgen Stock, rejected Taiwan's application for observer status, incorrectly stating that "Taiwan is part of China."¹³

The cumulative effect of these misguided statements can foster a false perception that bodies such as the United Nations and related international organizations have officially recognized Taiwan as part of China. It is therefore essential to continually challenge these statements and persistently correct the record as long as such misrepresentations endure.



This cannot be achieved by Taiwan alone, given its restricted access to and limited support within the international system. So far, only the United States has publicly challenged Beijing's distortion of UNGA resolution 2758. In 2021, Rick Waters, deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, publicly commented that the PRC has misused UNGA resolution 2758 to prevent Taiwan's meaningful participation.¹⁴ In a recent development, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act. This bill effectively states that UNGA resolution 2758 did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan or take a position on Taiwan's sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether the bill will pass the Senate and be signed into law.

Grounding Taiwan's Participation in an Inclusive, Responsible, Rules-Based Order

Taiwan's international engagement should not be viewed as an "internal affair" of the PRC, but rather as a valuable contribution to global governance. In an ideal world, Taiwan would fully participate in international organizations, but the current political reality warrants a more pragmatic approach. In other words, as long as full participation is not possible, Taiwan should seek meaningful connections with the international community to highlight its cooperation without necessitating explicit statehood recognition. This approach fosters collaboration and trust with other states and would be more likely to engender broader support for Taiwan, acknowledging the hesitation many countries have in endorsing Taiwan's claim for sovereign status.

Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations can be legally grounded within each

organization's specific charter and procedural rules. The WHO is a pertinent example. During the term of Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT Nationalist Party), when the CCP was more receptive to cooperating with his government, Taiwan was invited to participate in the annual World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009 to 2016, with Beijing's tacit consent.

However, since Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP took office in 2016, Taiwan's observer request at the WHA has been consistently denied. The WHO justifies this exclusion by referencing UNGA resolution 2758 and WHA resolution 25.1, which reiterated the content of UNGA resolution 2758.

But in fact, according to Article 3 of the WHA Rules of Procedure and the practice from 2009 to 2016, the WHO Director-General possesses the discretionary power to invite Taiwan as an observer. This invitation would have been particularly beneficial in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, the WHO's principal legal advisor misinterprets the organization's rules, claiming that the Director-General's observer invitations necessitate the backing of WHA member states. While this claim may have been made to avoid antagonizing Beijing, it lacks a legal basis. Neither the WHO Constitution nor the WHA Rules of Procedure require the Director-General to wait for WHA's approval to invite Taiwan as an observer.

Taiwan's difficulties in participating in international organizations extend beyond health and touch on critical sectors that have a direct bearing on its economic, environmental, and safety interests. For example, Taiwan has a significant stake in the rules under the UN climate change framework—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The challenges of climate



change not only affect Taiwan's environment but also have implications for its domestic legislation and governance, including issues related to carbon emissions and carbon tax. Taiwan's official exclusion from the UNFCCC means it has no voice in shaping rules that profoundly impact its industrial development. It has had to resort to sending proxies of non-governmental organizations and experts to the UN Climate Change Conferences (COP). While this approach helps Taiwan gather information indirectly, it falls far short of what is needed for a nation that has committed to reducing carbon emissions and achieving a net-zero carbon target by 2050.

In aviation, Taiwan faces similar challenges. Being a significant aviation hub, Taiwan's government has repeatedly sought "meaningful participation" in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 2009. The ICAO is where member states collaborate to establish standards and policies for international civilian aviation, ensuring compliance with global norms. Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration was invited to the ICAO General Assembly in 2013 as a special guest under the name of "Chinese Taipei," but only with Beijing's consent, and has not been invited since.

Based on Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the ICAO Assembly, observing as a non-contracting *state* to attend a session of the Assembly requires an invitation from either the ICAO Council or the ICAO Assembly. Since statehood appears to be a prerequisite for observer status, Taiwan's pursuit of observer status is unlikely to succeed given the current political dynamics in the organization. However, ICAO's practice of allowing industry representatives and civil society groups to participate as "Invited Organizations" offers a potential pathway for Taiwan to engage in ICAO's work. By leveraging its significant aviation industry

and fostering relationships with civil society groups, Taiwan may find alternative means to engage with international aviation standards and practices.

The situations with the WHA and ICAO illuminate Taiwan's precarious and often compromised position within international fora. In these instances, Taiwan's participation as an observer or guest was contingent on Beijing's approval, rather than being rooted in the rules of IOs. The reliance on Beijing's goodwill does not establish a sustainable precedent.

Turning to the case of Interpol, Taiwan's National Police Agency's Criminal Investigation Bureau has, since 2016, been striving to attain observer status at Interpol's General Assembly, using the moniker "Chinese Taipei." This effort is in line with the organization's General Regulations (Article 8(1)(a)) and the Rules of Procedure of the ICPO-INTERPOL General Assembly (Article 6(1)). These specific provisions allow police bodies that are not Interpol members to be invited as observers, provided both the inviting country and the Secretary-General approve the list of observers, as drawn up by the Interpol Executive Committee. Although political considerations inevitably influence this invitation process, Taiwan and its supporting countries must persevere in insisting that Interpol adhere to its own rules when considering Taiwan's bid for observer status, rather than yielding to Beijing's preferences.

Alternative Pathways for Taiwan as a Global Actor

The United States supports Taiwan's "robust, meaningful participation throughout the UN system and in the international community, consistent with the U.S. 'one China' policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three



Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.”¹⁵ In recent years, a growing number of countries have exhibited varying levels of support for Taiwan’s participation on the international stage, a position that does not necessarily entail a formal recognition of Taiwan’s statehood.

While it is undoubtedly critical to maintain support for Taiwan’s presence in the existing IOs, it is equally imperative to explore innovative avenues that can complement and work in tandem with the current system.

One such novel approach is the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). Established in 2015 by Taiwan and the United States, this initiative aims to enable Taiwan to share its best practices, particularly in the realm of public health, with other nations, including those in the developing world. The GCTF acknowledges the valuable insights and experiences that Taiwan, as a democratic society, can contribute, contrasting sharply with models rooted in authoritarian governance.

The GCTF is principally dedicated to conducting workshops that foster meaningful, substantive exchanges between experts from Taiwan and their counterparts in the United States and other countries. Unlike mere ceremonial or symbolic gatherings, these workshops have offered a platform for genuine discussion and collaboration.

The topics addressed in GCTF workshops are carefully selected to resonate with participants, spanning significant and diverse areas of interest. While the initial focus was on public health, the Framework has since expanded to cover fields such as law enforcement cooperation, women’s empowerment, energy efficiency, e-commerce, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and media literacy. These workshops

are planned over several months, with Taiwan collaborating with other GCTF partners to determine the focus areas and invite leading experts.

The success of the Framework relies on its commitment to professionalism and practicality. Because the issues tackled are often seen as less politically sensitive, they mitigate potential apprehensions among the countries involved. This pragmatic approach has encouraged the Framework’s expansion, with Japan coming on board as a full partner in 2019, followed by Australia in 2021. As the number of partnerships and contributing experts has increased, the GCTF has matured into a versatile multilateral platform, allowing all partners, including Taiwan, to actively engage with a diverse international community.¹⁶

Under the GCTF, three primary types of events emerge, fulfilling different objectives.

- **GCTF classics:** Held within Taiwan, these workshops usually span a few days. During the pandemic, they transitioned to online formats, but as of 2023, in-person meetings have gradually resumed.
- **GCTF franchise:** These workshops, conducted outside Taiwan, are designed to further widen Taiwan’s international networks beyond its borders.
- **International organization side events:** These are tailored to promote Taiwan’s participation in IOs and are often synchronized with significant international meetings such as those convened by the WHA and ICAO. Such workshops help deepen Taiwan’s understanding of global organizational functions and focal issues and enhance its capacity for international engagement.



Since its establishment, the GCTF has organized 60 workshops, attracting the participation of over 6,800 government officials, experts, and civil society representatives from 126 countries.¹⁷ Each of these events demands careful planning and organization, a process that Taiwan and its partners invest in heavily. This collaboration not only involves a great deal of manpower but also significant funding. For example, the U.S. Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2023 allocates not less than 4 million US dollars to be made available for the GCTF.¹⁸ While Taiwan and other partners may have more constrained resources compared to the United States, they must also recognize the necessity of committing to the resources essential for the Framework's effective operation.

Conclusion and Policy Prescriptions

Taiwan's Global Role and Strategic Approach

While Taiwan is excluded from many international organizations, Taipei must nonetheless maintain its commitment to a rule-based international order and seek to undertake international obligations as a responsible member. It should, for instance, continue to show its commitment to abide by international law by ratifying human rights treaties and integrating them into its domestic legal system,¹⁹ even though the UN Secretariat has rejected Taiwan's efforts to deposit its ratification. To fulfill its international commitments, Taiwan must be both strategic and steadfast, investing the necessary resources and designating an appropriate budget for key areas such as human rights adherence, international aid provision, and climate change mitigation. Through this principled, professional, and pragmatic approach, Taiwan strengthens its credibility as a reliable and trustworthy partner.

Principled and Responsible Practices by International Organizations

The legitimacy of international organizations rests on their commitment to good governance principles such as transparency and accountability. In handling the relationship between China and Taiwan, international organizations must understand the complexities and navigate the legal subtleties, *all within the bounds of their specified mandates*. Any covert agreements or uncritical acceptance of China's claim over Taiwan could undermine these foundational principles of the international organizations, and therefore, such agreements or stances should be rigorously investigated or examined.

Countering Beijing's Misinterpretation Campaigns

Beijing's effort to distort UNGA resolution 2758 in order to limit Taiwan's international role must be confronted, both in private and public forums. Given Taiwan's isolation from international institutions, it is essential for the United States and like-minded countries to refute such misleading narratives and prevent their normalization. Taiwan's international engagement has broader implications for maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait and good global governance. Even within the constraints of individual nations' "one China" policies, opportunities still exist to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in IOs, without necessitating formal recognition of Taiwan's statehood.

Coalitions to Support of Taiwan's International Engagement

Considering China's substantial influence within organizations like the United Nations, the United States plays a vital role in providing visible support to Taiwan. Through consistent and credible backing, Washington can also bolster confidence



among its regional and global partners to follow the policy of supporting Taiwan's international ties. Collective efforts by the United States and like-minded partners should also be directed towards the endorsement and placement of principled individuals committed to upholding the integrity of international institutions. The U.S. State Department's Office of Multilateral Strategy is engaged in this task. Accomplishing this mission calls for resilient coalitions that would be able to resist Beijing's influence.

Alternative Models for Taiwan's Global Presence

The GCTF presents an alternative model to enhance Taiwan's international presence and offers promising strategies to counteract Taiwan's isolation. All GCTF partners should continue to invest in the Framework, viewing it as a supplement to, not a replacement for, the current multilateral world order. They should emphasize the value and potential of such multilateral exchanges, thereby encouraging others to forge similar connections with Taiwan.

Taiwan should underscore the non-political nature of the Framework and create incentives for other countries to participate. Additionally, Taiwan should ensure the longevity of alumni networks within the GCTF. By close and lasting collaboration with partners and participating countries, Taiwan can establish itself as a valuable actor in the international community. Taiwan would also benefit from international engagements that are grounded in mutual respect and substantive collaboration, rather than political posturing.

Beijing's Responsibility

China must come to recognize the detrimental effects of its actions when pressuring IOs and their members to further its political agenda.

Such behavior ultimately undermines the broader objectives of these institutions. Acknowledging that Taiwan's security carries global implications could pave the way for a more peaceful and mutually beneficial outcome for all parties involved.

Yu-Jie Chen is the 2023 Taiwan Scholar of the Wilson Center's Asia Program. She is also an Assistant Research Professor, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, at Taipei's Academia Sinica, and a Non-Resident Affiliated Scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute of New York University's School of Law.

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-Yu-Jie Chen



Appendix A

2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

*1976th plenary meeting,
25 October 1971.*

Figure 1: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," United Nations Digital Library, October 25, 1971, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054>.



Appendix B

Table 1: Selected PRC Statements Regarding Its “One China Principle,” with Specific Reference to UNGA Resolution 2758

	<i>Date & Official Statement</i>	<i>Relevant Quotes</i>
1	01-16-2016 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Remarks on the Election in Taiwan	The Taiwan question falls within China's internal affairs. There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one and the same China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. The result of the election in Taiwan will not change the basic facts and the consensus of the international community.
2	05-20-2016 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on May 20, 2016	[T]he one-China principle has been widely recognized by the international community. It is also the political basis and prerequisite for the development of relations between China and other countries in the world.
3	12-20-2016 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on December 20, 2016	The one-China principle is the universal consensus of the international community, as well as our long-standing principle in dealing with issues about Taiwan's foreign interaction.
4	01-26-2017 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 26, 2017	The one-China principle, which is the prerequisite and cornerstone for China to develop its relations with all other countries, has become the general consensus of the international community, the will of the people and the trend of the times.
5	08-21-2018 Wang Yi Talks About the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and El Salvador	[A]dhering to the one-China principle is a universally recognized norm for international relations, a general consensus of the international community, as well as the fundamental foundation for China to establish and develop relations with any country.



	<i>Date & Official Statement</i>	<i>Relevant Quotes</i>
6	09-21-2019 Wang Yi On the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Solomon Islands	China must be and will be reunified. In terms of both facts and law, Taiwan was, is and will be an inalienable part of China. This status will not change and will not be possible to change. There are few countries which have not yet established diplomatic relations with China now. We believe more and more visionary people in these countries will stand out to send out a clear message that is in line with the trend of the times
7	05-24-2020 State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press	The Taiwan question is China's internal affair. The one-China principle is an international consensus and the political foundation of China's diplomatic relations with other countries. We firmly oppose official interactions with the Taiwan authorities disguised as health cooperation. We firmly oppose Taiwan's pursuit of so-called "international space" in violation of the one-China principle.
8	05-24-2021 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on Issues Relating to Taiwan at the 74th Session of WHA	In defiance of the aspiration of all parties and the well-being of Taiwan compatriots, the DPP authorities obstinately instigated their so-called "diplomatic allies" to make Taiwan-related proposals. A handful of countries have connived at this move, which goes against the trend of history and is doomed to fail. Relevant proposal has been rejected by the vast majority of countries in the world with a just stand. By the time the 74th session of the WHA opened, over 150 countries voiced their support for China's decision through diplomatic channels. More than 80 WHO members sent letters to the WHO to express their commitment to the one-China principle and opposition to Taiwan's participation in the WHA.
9	08-02-2022 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	On 2 August, in disregard of China's strong opposition and serious representations, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited China's Taiwan region. This is a serious violation of the one-China principle and the provisions of the three China-U.S. joint communiqués.



	<i>Date & Official Statement</i>	<i>Relevant Quotes</i>
10	08-10-2022 The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era	Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide. The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community; it is consistent with the basic norms of international relations. To date, 181 countries including the United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the one-China principle.
11	06-06-2023 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Statement on Tsai Ing-wen's "Transit" Through the United States	The one-China principle is a prevailing consensus of the international community and a basic norm in international relations. It is also the prerequisite and basis for the establishment and development of China-US diplomatic relations. Since taking office, Tsai has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus which embodies the one-China principle. Instead of reigning in separatist rhetoric and activities in Taiwan for "Taiwan independence," Tsai has supported and encouraged them, and sought to push for "incremental independence" under various pretenses. This has put cross-Strait relations in serious difficulty.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng>; Xinhua,



Endnotes

1. See e.g., Bonnie S. Glaser, *Taiwan's Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Jacques deLisle, "Taiwan's Quest for International Space: Ma's Legacy, Tsai's Options, China's Choices, and U.S. Policy," *Orbis* 60, Issue 4 (2016); Jacques deLisle, "Taiwan's Quest for International Space in the Tsai Era: Adapting Old Strategies to New Circumstances," in *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen*, ed. June Teufel Dreyer, Jacques deLisle (London: Routledge, 2021), 239-283.
2. The international legal status of the ROC (Taiwan) presents a layered debate. Some arguments strongly assert that it fulfills all statehood criteria, i.e., an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, is under the control of its own government and engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities. See Frank Chiang, *The One-China Policy: State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan's International Legal Status* (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2018). Yet, James Crawford, argued that "Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China and is not recognized as a State distinct from China." James R. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 219. However, the PRC's pronounced inclination to retaliate militarily if Taiwan declares de jure independence compounds the issue, making a formal declaration a perilous endeavor. In reality, Taiwan is unrecognized by many states that consider Taiwan part of the PRC. As a result, scholars struggle to define Taiwan's international legal status. While some scholars, such as Malcolm Shaw, maintain that Taiwan is part of China but under separate administration, others acknowledge that Taiwan has an international legal personality. For example, Victor Li labels it as "a de facto entity with international personality." For a discussion of various scholars' views, see Hungdah Chiu, "The International Legal Status of the Republic of China," in *Occasional Papers/ Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies* 1992, no. 5, article 1 (1992): 8-10. Scott Pegg considers Taiwan "a de facto state," defined as "a secessionist entity that receives popular support and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area over which it maintains effective control for an extended period of time." See Scott Pegg, "De Facto States in the International System," *Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia; Working Paper*, no. 21 (1998). Some scholars categorize Taiwan and the Vatican City as "entities sui generis," which have "an international legal status though they do not easily fit into any of the established categories." Louis Henkin et al., *International Law: Cases and Materials* (West Publishing, 1993), 299.
3. For a recent discussion of various one China policies, see Adam P. Liff and Dalton Lin's lead article, "The 'One China' Framework at 50 (1972–2022): The Myth of 'Consensus' and Its Evolving Policy Significance," in *The China Quarterly* 252 (2022): 977–1000, as well as accompanying articles in the same special section.
4. "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," *China.org.cn*, August, 1993, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7953.htm>.
5. For an excellent analysis of UNGA resolution 2758, see Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, "The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and Limits on Taiwan's Access to the United Nations," March 24, 2022, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/distortion-un-resolution-2758-and-limits-taiwans-access-united-nations>.
6. Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, "The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and Limits on Taiwan's Access to the United Nations."
7. United Nations, *United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2010* (2011), 516-517 & 539-540.



8. "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era," Xinhua, August 10, 2022, <https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.html>.
9. "6th Committee: statement by Dr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General, to the 6th Committee of the General Assembly," United Nations Digital Library, September 27, 1947, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1643922>.
10. Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, "The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and Limits on Taiwan's Access to the United Nations."
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