Ukraine Quarterly Digest: April–June 2023

The second quarter of 2023 was dominated by preparations for Ukraine's counteroffensive operation, which started in late June. Fighters received specialized training, and arms and matériel were rounded up. Looking for greater international support, Ukraine devoted massive efforts to connect with as many states as possible, including those well off Ukraine's radar in recent years.

An explosion attributed to Russia destroyed the dam of the Nova Kakhovka hydropower plant, with devastating and longlasting humanitarian, social, environmental, and economic impacts. The loss of a water supply for the cooling ponds at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant jeopardized the plant’s safety, which was worsened in other ways as well. Kyiv expects Russia may try to organize a nuclear accident at the power plant and blame it on Ukraine.

1. ROLLOUT OF THE WAR

General Developments during April–June

During heavy fighting in the second quarter of the year, the Russian forces did not make significant progress. The key feature of the war in this period was Ukraine’s preparation for its counteroffensive, which started in June but was far from 100 percent capacity. In late June, the Ukrainian army began to regain some territory that had previously fallen under Russian control.

At the front, Russia resorted to scorched-earth tactics, destroying everything with air strikes, artillery fire, and sometimes white phosphorus munitions. The heaviest battles took place near Bakhmut, Maryinka, Avdiyivka, and Lyman in Donetsk oblast and Kupiansk in Kharkiv oblast. Despite concern over force strengths, Ukraine has managed to defend Bakhmut, the epicenter of Russia’s war, for more than a year, and has even made progress in some neighboring areas.

New Air Attack Tactics. The Russians amended their air attack tactics, probably driven by the dwindling supply of cruise missiles. In regions close to the front, they resorted to massive strikes with guided bombs dropped from warplanes. In other regions, most attacks were conducted with Iranian drones, ballistic missiles, and even supersonic missiles. Russia has probably created a new assault aviation group to operate in the skies over Ukraine. In addition, at the front lines, the Russian army frequently resorted to the use of helicopters, probably to compensate for the lack of artillery, in an attempt to stop the Ukrainian forces.

May was among the most active months with respect to the number and frequency of air attacks since the invasion. For instance, Kyiv was attacked seventeen times. Often the Russian forces combined the use of drones, ballistic devices, and supersonic missiles in a single attack. The concentration of mixed technologies could represent an attempt to slow the rollout of the counteroffensive and wear down Ukraine’s air defense systems.

In the face of these attacks, the Ukrainian air defense forces proved highly effective. In May they shot down the Russian supersonic missile Kinzhal for the first time; the Kinzhal had earlier been promoted by Vladimir Putin as an invincible weapon. As of mid-June, Ukrainian air forces had reported about thirteen downed Kinzhals.

Operations inside Russia. In the second quarter of 2023, dozens of drones attacked different targets inside Russia. No one has taken responsibility for these attacks, which included a drone explosion over the Kremlin. A couple of operations were conducted in Belgorod, Russia, near the border with Ukraine by legions consisting of Russians who were fighting on the side of Ukraine under the names Freedom of Russia and the Russian Volunteer Corps. Ukrainian military personnel did not cross the Russian border.

Though local government officials had announced their own “counterterrorism operation” in response to these attacks, Russian army forces couldn't deal with the intrusions, and the legions conducted a few more operations, even staying in Russian cities. These operations had the effect of motivating the Russian army to regroup and change its strategies before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Ukrainian intelligence services said they had gained valuable information from these incursions.

Counteroffensive Operations

Despite high interest on the part of the public, Kyiv kept mum about plans for the massive counteroffensive. Western media reported that Kyiv was keeping details hidden even from Ukraine’s allies. On June 10, President Zelensky acknowledged that the counteroffensive had begun. Western officials and media, based on information from sources, reported that only a few of the specially trained reserve forces designated for counteroffensive operations had been involved in the operations. Since mid-June, the army has reported liberating some settlements and making advances on multiple fronts.

The Kakhovka Dam Disaster

On June 6, an explosion attributed to Russia destroyed the enormous Nova Kakhovka dam and the floodwaters rushed downstream, inundating neighboring areas. Russian forces had taken control of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant in February 2022, at the beginning of the wide-scale invasion, and in October had planted explosives inside the dam and the plant. Kyiv became cognizant of these actions and cautioned that Russia intended to blow up the dam. The impact of the dam’s collapse on the power system was relatively minor compared to the humanitarian, social, environmental, and economic impacts.

The reservoir created by the dam had provided drinking water to five regions, which will suffer from water scarcity—700,000 people lack proper access to potable water. The dam’s collapse will undermine water-hungry industrial and agrarian production in a few regions. The blow to the agrarian sector is expected to cause huge problems for food security globally, especially in the global south, as described in an earlier Kennan Institute Focus Ukraine blog piece on the impacts.

Crimea has lost its water supply, and there are threats to Black Sea ecosystems from the toxins being washed downstream from upstream activities on the Dnipro river.

The reservoir had supplied the cooling ponds of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, so the risk of a nuclear accident has increased. The IAEA was not confident how long the existing water reserves could last because of various external factors, such as evaporation and possible future leaks.

Worsened Situation with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Russians continued the militarization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, creating more threats to nuclear safety. A Russian mine explosion near the fourth unit resulted in extensive damage to windows in the turbine hall. In May the NPP temporarily lost its power supply for the seventh time. These incidents raised concern with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because of the unpredictable nature of the situation and the clear risks to nuclear safety.

After the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam, President Zelensky warned of Russian plans to organize an explosion of the NPP. Earlier, Ukrainian intelligence had revealed that Russia was planning to simulate shelling and an accident at the NPP with radioactive material emissions as a false flag operation, for which it would blame Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence services said that in addition, Russians had mined the NPP in mid-June. The risk that Russia might cause a real nuclear accident while trying to deflect blame from itself is growing. In late June, Ukrainian intelligence said that the Russians were ready to launch a nuclear incident at the power plant.

Russia’s Position on the War

In the second quarter, the Kremlin started changing the narrative about the war. Key messages promoted recently include the following: Russia is ready to stop the war and retain the lands it has occupied. Russia is trying to stop a war it did not start and does not want, but Ukraine and the West do not want peace. Russia has successfully thwarted Ukraine’s counteroffensive operation (which, however, is barely underway). In all these narratives and more, Russia attempts to portray itself as victim rather than aggressor, just as it has done from the start. At the same time, the Kremlin has continued blackmailing by upping the likelihood of a nuclear accident at Zaporizhzhia NPP, threatening to resort to nuclear weapons use, and conducting further air attacks on Ukrainian cities.

Certain controversions of truth inform this new narrative. President Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said that Russia has largely achieved the goal of “demilitarizing Ukraine,” pointing out that Ukraine has lost a large part of its existing weapon supply but neglecting to mention the huge supply of modern weapons that Ukraine has received from its allies. Peskov also explained the Russian army’s lack of progress in Ukraine by saying Russia is not conducting a war of aggression and refrains from destroying cities, a claim that does not comport with the facts of mass destruction, the targeting of civilian infrastructure, and the numerous crimes attributed to Russian forces. Vladimir Putin himself issued a controversial statement that the goals of the war remain unchanged, but could change on an ad hoc basis.

Putin lied again about history, saying that Ukraine is located in Russian territory. However, the Republic of Ukraine defined its future territory in 1917 according to a population count and identification of territories where Ukrainians were in the majority. Furthermore, some of the Ukrainian territories Russia has occupied were the cradle of the Ukrainian nation.

Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

The Nova Kakhovka dam was not the only dam blown up by Russians. Another small one later was destroyed in Donetsk oblast, causing flooding. The Ukrainian army had made some progress in counterforce operations in that area. Russia continued air attacks on the energy facilities, damaging the power systems and natural gas production. Despite some structural damage, energy supplies were very little affected.

Ukrainian intelligence services said that Russians had mined the Titan plant in Crimea, which produced titanium dioxide. Huge stocks of ammonia and sulfuric acid are located at the plant. The Kakhovka dam collapse left the plant without needed water supplies, causing production delays and explaining the perverse logic of destroying the factory.

Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civil Infrastructure

Russia continued deporting children from the occupied territories. As of early June, the Ukrainian government had identified 20,000 deported children, including 4,500 orphans or children deprived of parental care. The share of all children who return from deportation is very small. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized that the forcible transfer and “russification” of Ukrainian children constitute evidence of genocide. At least 500 children have been killed and thousands of others wounded in the course of the hostilities. Videos are available in which Russian militants confirm they killed young children. The UN has added Russia to its global list of shame for maiming and killing children in Ukraine.

Ukraine suspects Belarus is involved in the kidnapping and transfer of Ukrainian children and POWs. The Belarusian Red Cross has said that more than 700 Ukrainian children are in the country.

And Russia continued committing crimes against civilians in the occupied territories. Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing forced deportations from these regions. Russians "arrest" civilians in the occupied territories in Ukraine’s East and mobilize them to fight against Ukraine. The occupiers conduct searches and kidnap those with active pro-Ukrainian inclinations. Deported Ukrainians are sent to fifty-five regions deep inside Russia to assimilate. Russian officials said that 1.5 million Ukrainians there had obtained Russian passports.

In June, the Kremlin confirmed its desire to hold (sham) elections in September in the occupied territories. This will require the quick issuance of Russian passports. The occupiers have continued pressuring Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories to obtain Russian passports by restricting needed medicines and threatening to cut off the power supply, confiscate property, and forcibly evict those who refuse. Some have already been sent to filtration camps. In a particularly heinous move, Russian forces refused to evacuate non-Russian-passport holders after the Kakhovka dam explosion, leaving them to drown or to attempt to flee to safety in Ukrainian skiffs under gunfire.

The Russian army has also continued attacking civilian targets with air and ground strikes. The destroyed structures include apartment buildings, the Odesa seaport, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, fueling stations, and churches.

Crimes Against Military Personnel

Videos of the execution of Ukrainian soldiers by Russian soldiers have spread rapidly on the internet. They are not isolated cases. In some cases, Russians have killed Ukrainian POWs because of their refusal to speak Russian, and some were killed after interrogation. The Ukrainian human rights commissioner Dmytro Lubintes said that 86 percent of Ukrainian POWs were tortured and that he had received “dozens of videos” of public executions of Ukrainian military personnel by Russian soldiers. The torture and execution of POWs are breaches of the Geneva Conventions and constitute war crimes. Ukraine has appealed to the International Criminal Court to investigate these crimes on an urgent basis.

2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

During the second quarter of 2023, a few more countries recognized the Holodomor (the Great Famine) of 1932–1933 as a genocide of the Ukrainian people organized by the Kremlin regime. Croatia, France, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom were added to the list of such countries. NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly issued another essential statement recognizing Russia's crimes against Ukraine as genocide.

The Council of Europe Summit created a register of damage for Ukraine. Forty-four countries and the EU have joined or indicated their intention to join; other states are free to join. That marks the first step toward creating an international compensation mechanism for the victims of Russian aggression.

President Zelensky’s Diplomatic Tours

President Zelensky remained a key newsmaker in Ukraine’s foreign affairs as he sought to connect with as many states as possible, including those well off Ukraine's radar in recent years. The president visited several states, meeting their leaders and addressing parliaments in hopes of increasing their support for Ukraine. Most of these visits were unannounced and took place on a tight schedule. They seem to have been very effective as the allies’ support for Ukraine is growing.

On May 3, President Zelensky visited Finland for a summit with Nordic leaders. The next day he visited the Netherlands, addressed the Dutch parliament, and delivered a speech at The Hague titled "No Peace without Justice." Ukraine, Belgium, and the Netherlands signed a joint declaration expressing unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

In mid-May, President Zelensky undertook a whirlwind diplomatic tour of some key European capitals. On May 13 he arrived in Rome to meet Pope Francis and to discuss security and military cooperation with the Italian president and prime minister. He then left for Berlin to discuss military aid, postwar reconstruction, and Ukraine’s NATO and EU aspirations with German officials. That same day he flew to Paris to meet French president Emmanuel Macron. On May 15, Zelensky traveled to London and met with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. The G7 leaders reaffirmed their "unwavering support" for Ukraine for as long as is necessary to achieve a "just and lasting peace."

Also in mid-May, President Zelensky visited Saudi Arabia for the first time and attended the Arab League summit, looking for support from the Arab countries and presenting his ten-point peace plan. The president stressed Ukraine’s importance to the region as a grain exporter. Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman expressed his readiness to mediate the war. Earlier, on May 5, Bahrain's foreign minister had visited Kyiv for the first time and met President Zelensky. A delegation from the UAE visited Kyiv in June.

After the Arab League summit, Zelensky attended the G7 meeting in Japan in person, giving a speech to leaders and taking personal meetings with some leaders, including U.S. president Joe Biden, German chancellor Olaf Scholz, and UK prime minister Rishi Sunak. In early June he attended the European Political Community summit in Moldova. EU and NATO integration and additional military support, including the “fighter jet coalition,” were among the key topics of bilateral meetings Zelensky held with European leaders.

Relations with the United States and Canada

The United States remains a key ally in the war against Russia and a leading provider of military aid, standing in defense of freedom and justice. President Biden reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their sovereignty and democracy against Russia’s invasion. In June the United States announced a new $2.1 billion military aid package for Ukraine.

In April, Ukrainian prime minister Denys Shmyhal visited Canada, and Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau visited Kyiv in June. The countries updated their free-trade agreement, in force since 2017, to expand the list of goods covered by the zero-duty trade regime.

The Ukrainian nuclear power company Energoatom signed contracts with the Canadian Cameco on enriching Ukrainian uranium and transporting supplies of enriched uranium, earlier carried by Russian companies. Thanks to the cooperation Westinghouse and Cameco, the Ukrainian nuclear power sector has now become independent of Russia.

Relations with the EU and Other European States

The EU recognized Ukraine’s progress on some political reforms necessary for future membership talks. EU officials and member states continued demonstrating support for Ukraine. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen arrived in Ukraine to celebrate the day of Europe in Kyiv—“where the values Europe holds are defended every day.” European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson visited Kyiv to discuss police cooperation and war crimes investigations. The commissioner said that the EU had not observed any significant weapons smuggling into Europe from wartime Ukraine. According to the agreements signed in June, 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers will be trained under the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine.

EU governments extended by a year the suspension of duties and quotas on imports from Ukraine to help Ukraine’s economy during the war with Russia. The EU and Ukraine agreed on mutual recognition of court decisions. In May the EU approved a €1 billion plan to finance the provision of artillery rounds and missiles.

Poland. In April, President Zelensky visited Poland, a key Ukrainian ally. As of mid-May, Poland had delivered 325 tanks out of the 575 promised by Ukraine's partners and ten MiG-29 fighter jets. The two countries signed a joint memorandum on the reconstruction of war-damaged areas of Ukraine and the production of tank rounds. They agreed to repair T-64 tanks jointly, and, as planned, German Leopard tanks will also be repaired in Poland. About 80 percent of Poles view Polish-Ukrainian relations positively. The only issue that cast a shadow on bilateral relations in the second quarter of 2023 was a disagreement over Ukrainian agricultural exports (described below). Polish president Andrzej Duda visited Kyiv in late June with his Lithuanian counterpart. Both expressed support for Ukraine's NATO membership.

Germany. Germany became one of the key supporters and providers of military aid to Ukraine in 2023. In May, Germany announced a new, record-high aid volume of almost $3 billion. This level of assistance is dramatically different from what Germany was willing to provide earlier: in early 2022 the German government was ready to provide only 5,000 helmets, and as the invasion swiftly unfolded, German finance minister Christian Lindner was against supplying weapons to Ukraine, expecting the county to fail shortly. Now Germany is sending Ukraine arms of vital importance, preparing to produce munitions, and training Ukrainian soldiers.

In early April, German vice chancellor Habeck visited Ukraine to discuss the country’s renovation. The parties also signed a memorandum on expanding their energy partnership. President Zelensky twice met with Chancellor Olaf Scholz, once during his visit to Berlin and again when attending the G7 summit in Japan.

In May, Ukrainian and German defense companies signed an agreement on a strategic partnership and agreed to establish a joint venture that will commence operations in July. The partnership will start with the repair of armored vehicles and move on to the production of weapons and military equipment.

Slovakia. President Zuzana Čaputová and her Czech counterpart, Petr Pavel, visited Ukraine in April. Later, the three countries agreed on the joint purchase and repair of infantry fighting vehicles. The Czech Republic agreed to a joint repair of T-64 tanks with Ukraine.

Denmark. Ukraine signed a five-year agreement with Denmark to help rebuild destroyed wind power capacities and strengthen its energy independence from Russia. Denmark committed to providing €1 billion for Ukraine’s restoration and a new package of military aid in June worth $3.2. billion. Ukraine’s neighbors Romania and Moldova signed a joint statement of security cooperation.

Hungary. Another round of tensions took place in relations with Hungary, as has become almost a tradition in bilateral relations in recent years. Hungary blocked EU off-budget military support for Ukraine, threatened to block new anti-Russian sanctions unless Kyiv took the Hungarian OTP bank off its blacklist, questioned the future of Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, and so on. But some undiplomatic statements were uttered as well. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán referred to Ukraine as financially "nonexistent," and later said Ukraine could not win against Russia.

In June, Hungarian officials stated that eleven Ukrainian POWs of Hungarian origin had been received from Russia; Kyiv had not previously been informed of the transfer. Top-ranking Hungarian officials denied they had been informed about the swap or were involved in it, claiming that the Russian Orthodox Church had organized it. Only five of the eleven returned home, and Ukrainian diplomats were unsuccessful in contacting the rest.

Relations with Iran

Iran continued supplying weapons to Russia to be used in the war against Ukraine. Those technologies included drones, which, as Ukraine’s military officials admit, are a problem for Ukraine’s air defense. Tehran even bragged that its drones are "game-changers" in Ukraine. In late May the Ukrainian parliament approved fifty-year sanctions against Iran. These sanctions ban any trade and transit operations, including flights, and stipulate steps to prevent the withdrawal of capital by Iranians residing in Ukraine. Ukraine, together with Canada, Sweden, and the UK, filed a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice over the downing of a Ukrainian airliner by Iran in early 2020.

Other Countries

In recent months Kyiv has started paying more attention to Africa. Foreign Affairs Minister Dmytro Kuleba made a diplomatic tour of Africa, seeking support for Ukraine’s UN General Assembly resolutions. On June 16, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Senegal’s President Macky Sall, and high-ranking officials of some other African states visited Ukraine with ideas for a peace plan. The disruption of grain and other food supplies and aggravated inflation have made African states deeply concerned about the war in Ukraine. At the same time, many African states have close ties with Russia. Earlier, the U.S. ambassador to South Africa said that country had likely supplied weapons to Russia, and urged it to hew to its non-alignment policy. After visiting Kyiv, the African leaders left for talks in Moscow.

Diplomatic tension marred relations with Brazil. The country’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, suggested that Ukraine should be open to giving up Crimea in exchange for peace with Russia. Lula proposed that a club of nations, to include China and Brazil, mediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby exploded at the suggestion: “Brazil is parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda without at all looking at the facts,” he said. Brazil has also refused to sell arms to Ukraine.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue defense meeting in Singapore in early June, Indonesia's defense minister also proposed a plan, to include a demilitarized zone, with the recommendation that the wishes of the residents of the disputed territories be ascertained. It is hard to imagine a plan along these lines would be approved by Kyiv as it would narrow Ukrainian sovereign territory; Kyiv claims all of the non-government-controlled lands as Ukrainian, and therefore finds “no disputed territories between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”

Relations with Russia

In May the Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution recognizing Putin's regime as “ruscist.” Ruscism, a portmanteau word, manifests in systematic violations of human rights and freedoms, cults of the leader, the use of force and militarism, systematic violations of the territorial integrity of other states, and disregard for international law. Ukraine also appealed to the global community to condemn ruscism.

In the second quarter of 2023, Kyiv continued imposing sanctions on Russian citizens, political factions and politicians, and companies, including Russian companies in Ukraine, nationalizing some of those.

In April the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ordered Russia to pay Ukraine's Naftogaz $5 billion in compensation for “the illegal seizure of Naftogaz assets” in Crimea. As Russia did not respond, in late June Naftogaz asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to confirm the decision and proceed with forcible collection under the New York Arbitration Convention, which handles enforcement of foreign awards.

The Grain Export Agreement

After a dispute in March regarding an extension of the grain deal, which had an expiration date of May 18 (Russia wanted to extend it for 60 days only, whereas all other parties demanded a 120-day extension, in accordance with the original agreement), in April Russia started slowing the pace of required grain cargo ship inspections, with some ships waiting up to three months now for inspection. This delay amounted to a blockade of ships and raised concern in the UN. Russia appears to be using inspections as a bargaining chip in its quest to transit ammonia through Ukraine’s pipelines.

Ukrainian grain exports have fallen drastically, with related losses as of late May amounting to $1 billion. At the same time, Russian ships were spotted stealing Ukrainian grain and metal. The G7 is working on a mechanism to combat the suspected theft of Ukraine's grain.

Agricultural Exports Disputes

In April, the countries helping to transit Ukraine's agricultural products went to the European Commission to help resolve the problem of imports occurring in the context of domestic market oversaturation. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria took it upon themselves to temporarily ban (for a couple of months) the import of Ukrainian grain and some food products unilaterally, without the European Commission’s approval. Romania expressed concern but did not introduce a ban. After pressure from countries with abundant grain production of their own, the European Commission approved a temporary ban on importing wheat, corn, rapeseed, sunflower seeds, and sunflower oil from Ukraine until mid-September, while allowing its transit.

Hungary was the only country that did not lift its unilateral ban. In response to embargoes, Ukraine banned sugar exports. A sugar shortage is now expected to occur in Hungary. The tension with Poland also continued. Ukraine and the European Commission agreed to establish a consultative group to monitor issues related to exports. But as of the end of June, the dispute had not been settled.

The Fighter Jet Coalition

Kyiv has continued pushing allies to provide Ukraine with fighter jets. As with tanks, a long period of refusal shifted when Western countries agreed to provide them. According to media reports, Ukraine might receive F-16 fighter jets in early 2024. Earlier, different countries agreed to instruct Ukrainian pilots and mechanics in flying and maintaining F-16 jets.

3. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Economic Situation

The Ukrainian economy started recovering, with a 2.4 percent GDP growth in the first quarter of 2023, up from the fourth quarter of 2022. This growth is higher than expected. The National Bank of Ukraine expects the Kakhovka dam collapse will bring down the GDP by 0.2 percent.

Inflation slowed as well. In April 2023, consumer inflation in Ukraine decreased to 17.9 percent in annual terms. A labor shortage has stopped the fall in wages. In the second quarter, most (62 percent) small and medium-sized businesses paid salaries in full; 32 percent said they had no financial reserves and 16 percent dismissed employees. 

The Energy Situation

Despite Russia’s relentless attacks on the energy infrastructure, Ukraine’s power system survived. Repair of damaged infrastructure and increasing the production of solar power plants resulted in a surplus of electricity and no power cutoffs to customers during the second quarter.

In the end, the improving situation made electricity exports possible starting April 11, such that Russia’s attacks could almost be considered to have failed (a separate Kennan Focus Ukraine text explains how the power system survived). But a huge amount of power capacity had to be maintained, with the result that in May and June, the country had to import electricity to meet demand. Ukraine also renovated and put into operation a high-voltage power line to Poland, one that had not been used since the early 1990s. The availability of the transmission line expanded Ukraine’s capacity for exporting and importing electricity. Nonetheless, and erring on the side of caution, Ukraine has not lifted the natural gas and coal export ban in anticipation of a potential lack of heating fuels during the coming winter.

The Arrest of the Supreme Court’s Head

In May the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine detained Ukraine’s Supreme Court chairman, Vsevolod Kniaziev, after he was caught taking a bribe of almost $3 million. The judges of the Supreme Court described it as an evil day. At a plenary meeting of the Supreme Court, 140 of 142 judges voted to dismiss Kniaziev. The criminal investigation continues.

4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIES

President Zelenskyy approved the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for reforming the law enforcement system for 2023–2027. It covers the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Police, the State Border Guard Service, the State Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the State Customs Service of Ukraine. The plan was developed to implement seven EU recommendations for Ukraine’s candidacy to be considered.

Increased Electricity Price for Households

In April, the government decided to almost double the electricity prices paid by households. Electricity sales to households were deeply unprofitable and had been subsidized by state-owned energy companies. However, these companies, above all the national nuclear power company Energoatom, were suffering economically from the war and could not cover the deficit at the low prices charged to households.

During 2015–2017 Ukraine saw a five-stage campaign to increase the tariff, which was increased by 3.5 times its earlier level. In 2021 the tariff was changed a small amount. The current inflationary environment, on top of less than optimal price increases, has led to an unsustainable situation. The deep subsidization of households' energy consumption was not in accordance with the EU’s rules and principles regarding energy markets that Ukraine must comply with.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.